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ICAC AND THE COMMUNITY
Mark Findlay
Director
Institute of Criminology
There seems to exist some necessary relationship between the specifics of
particular communities, and the institutional mechanics created towards the control
of their corruption:
The acceptability, appropriateness and potency of any institutional response to
corruption depends on a recognition that such a response will be bound to the
community out of which it emerged.'
Perhaps that statement should be qualified by the rider that such a
dependency must be appreciated in actual 'success' terms (at least as defined by the
control agency itself), rather than merely at the level of appearances. In this regard
anti-corruption initiatives are little different from other aspects of state-based crime
control.
Recently the language of 'community' has been widely used in the official discourse
of criminal justice administration in Australia, in an obvious effort to legitimate new
developments away from more traditional crime control. Commentators are now
asking, why all this 'community speak' about policing, mediation, and corrections?
2
As regards the 'community' perspective of anti-corruption initiatives, it is an attempt
to transfer to the new institutions and processes some of the more positive
implications which are assumed to flow from community allegiance:
9 consensus
" shared responsibility and implication
" democratic authority
" mutual accountability
" regeneration
In Hong Kong this ascription to community symbolism is at the heart of the
ICAC's public profile. For instance, when describing the operations of the
Community Relations Section, official governmental literature emphasises its
responsibility "for enhancing public awareness of the evils of corruption, and
harnessing community support for the Commission's efforts".3 The language of ICAC
publications talks in just such terms; "the community will reap the benefits in years to
come, when students of today become leaders of tomorrow - young men and women
to whom corruption is an unacceptable way of life".4 Infused with the spirit of such
1 Findlay, M., "Institutional Responses to Corruption: Some Critical Reflections on the ICAC"
[1988] Crimnal Law Journal 271
2 See Hogg, R. & Findlay, M., "Police and the Community, Some Issues Raised by Recent Overseas
Research" in Freckelton and Selby, eds, Police in Our Society (1988)
3 Hong Kong: The Facts - ICAC (1987) 2
4 An Introduction to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (2nd ed. 1987) 37
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dogma the Hong Kong ICAC has been able to orchestrate, during the past fifteen
years, what proponents have hailed as a 'value revolution' in a society where the
tolerance and adaptation of corruption was fabled.
The same community nexus, at least in a symbolic sense, has not been a feature of the
genesis of the ICAC in New South Wales. This paper speculates on some of the
reasons for this apparent divergence through a detailed comparison with the Hong
Kong experience. Further, I will comment on the consequences for corruption
control when its institutional manifestations are distanced from the community.
So as to order the initial comparative analysis it is useful to focus on features which at
first glance seem common to corruption control initiatives. These then can be
particularised in terms of the more established Hong Kong experience. Against this,
the differences in the NSW experiment will -be highlighted. Commonality generally
might be assumed in the following;
" the advent of the corruption control institutions
* their mandate
" their powers to discharge this mandate
" their institutional structure
* relations with other agencies of the criminal justice process
" accountability
From the Hong Kong vantage point alone, each of these merit a somewhat more
detailed examination.
ADVENT
The socio-political background behind establishing the ICAC in Hong Kong saw the
convergence of a variety of quite potent influences. The sensational public
disclosures concerning endemic police corruption in the early seventies whipped up
a universal appreciation of the extent of corruption at all levels of commerce and
administration in the Territory. The attitude of the community changed from
reluctant acceptance to widespread moral panic as the disclosures gave substance to
the long held and universal suspicions about police graft, with the flight of Chief
Superintendent Godber.5 A detailed recognition of the consequences for the
community, which are the broader result of such fundamental corruption, was
broadcast across Hong Kong for the first time in any official sense, through the
hearings of the Bain Commission of Enquiry into the Godber case. The Royal Hong
Kong Police were so demoralised and divided at this time that they could not
advance any credible opposition to the Commission's findings, nor could they hope
to regain any semblence of limited public credibility without the anguish of a full
purge at all ranks. The Governor of the day, Sir Murray MacLehose, was reformist
5 See Downey, B. "Combatting Corruption: The Hong Kong Solution' (1976) 6 Hong Kong Law
Journal 27
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and did not shy away from the challenge of just such a reorganisation. Finally, the
enacting Ordinance was preceded by necessary supportive legislation (for example,
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 1971) which established the offence types and
associated powers of investigation so essential for the ICAC's initial and immediate
successes. Community interest groups were primed and ripe in 1974 to accept the
dramatic impact of these initiatives.
MANDATE
With the enactment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance
in 1974 the new body was charged (under section 12) with the control of 'corrupt
practices' in all their many public and private sector manifestations. However the
drafters of the Ordinance chose not to present within the bounds of the Ordinance
any comprehensive definition of corrupt practices. This was left for the
Commissioner to determine bearing in mind the scope and spirit of his powers and
duties. The decision not to limit the province of the ICAC in Hong Kong through
some artificial distinction over the origins of corruption, was a realistic recognition
that in modern capitalist economies the division between public and private 'sectors'
is at best both flexible and blurred. Further, the progress of corruption itself is rarely
impeded by any such conceptual nicety. Having said this, the initial thrust of the
ICAC's attack on corruption was, not surprisingly, against the public service. In
recent years this interest has gradually been replaced by significant private practice
targetting.
In Hong Kong, as with the traditional recognition of influence, the ICAC's focus on
corruption is directed against the offering and accepting of 'advantages'. As such this
touched almost everyone in the Territory and gave common meaning to the offence
of bribery.
In all its operations the Hong Kong ICAC says that it strives to give effect to its
mandate both as a client centred and complaints initiated process.
POWERS
The Hong Kong ICAC has concentrated its operational concerns on an offence
based process of initiation. The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance is the principal
legislative basis for these endeavours, with its concise offence structure. This is
supplemented by the Anti-Corruption Ordinance, concentrating as it does on
fraudulent electoral practices.
The powers specifically conferred on the Commissioner of the ICAC are a significant
expansion of police investigation practices, although in form they are modelled on
these. Only the powers of confiscation, inferential evidence, and compulsory
interrogation are novel in themselves.
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ICAC investigation and evidence accumulation practices are not tied to formal or
public hearings. If anything, they are 'in house' and rely heavily on covert facilitation.
In principal the exercise of the ICAC's investigation powers is controlled at the
output level, by the Attorney General's fiat over the lodgement of prosecutions. The
Commission might be very much the master of the pre-trial stage of corruption
prosecution, but whether their's is a sufficient case to enter open court is a decision
for the first law officer of the Territory. In this regard the reward for their
operational efforts might be seen as confronted by the final guarantees of due
process.
STRUCTURE
The institutional entity which is the Hong Kong ICAC is built on three equally
important commitments to corruption control;
" the identification, prosecution and punishment of corrupt practices
* corruption prevention
" education against corruption
The structure of this ICAC has evolved inextricably out of these three concerns.
a) Operations
The Operations Department is the investigative arm of the Hong Kong ICAC, and
comprises over 60% of its establishment. It reviews and considers complaints and
information, and investigates alleged offences under the various anti-corruption
Ordinances.
From 1974 to 1986, 77,729 complaints and reports were received through this branch
of the Commission, and 29,880 were deemed to be corruption related. For the same
period the Operations Department carried out 14,109 investigations, resulting in
4,021 prosecutions. There was a fairly even mix between pulic and private 'sector'
corruption prosecutions (1,130 to 977 respectively). On average these figures
indicate the following turnover for this Department;
" Four completed investigations per week
" Thirty five prosecutions filed each year
b) Corruption Prevention
The Commissioner has a statutary duty to secure the revision of methods of work
which may provide opportunities for corruption in government departments and
public bodies, and to advise any organisation or person on the elimination of corrupt
practices on request. To do this the Corruption Prevention Department carries out
detailed studies in consultation with the organisation concerned. As a follow up the
Department monitors the implementation and efficacy of its recommendations.
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The Department also provides training in corruption prevention methods. By the
conclusion of 1986, 31,271 participants from 31 government departments and
eighteen organisations outside the government had attended such sessions.
c) Community Relations
This Department endeavours to increase public awareness of corruption, as well as
stimulating and co-ordinating public support for the Commission's initiatives. To
achieve these aims the Department works on two fronts: public education through
the mass media; and face to face contact with the community. Liaison with the
community is conducted either through a central co-ordination office, or at a district
level through local offices. The latter serve as focal points for establishing and
maintaining contact with the local community, and for launching anti-corruption
programs which vary from shop front visits to organising youth camps and forums.
The operations of these three structural units consume a massive budget of over $20
million (Aust) per annum. This has grown to over three times that of the budget for
the ICAC's initial year of operation.
The ICAC is not entirely organisationally unique in terms of Hong Kong
administrative experience. The requirement that it independently reports directly to
the Governor is not unusual in a form of government where major policy is the
province of the Governor's Executive Council. The audit function of the ICAC is
common in both the private and public spheres of administration, as in government
where legislative control is developed through exercises of compromise. The ICAC,
after its initial period of confrontation and isolation, has been integrated into the
wider operations of the criminal justice process while at the same time maintaining
its exclusivity in corruption regulation. Finally, the public education commitment of
the ICAC, with its unashamedly moralist tone, is not far removed from other Hong
Kong community education campaigns such as the successful "Keep Hong Kong
Clean" program.
RELATIONS WITH OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES
The initial confrontations between the ICAC and the Royal Hong Kong Police Force
were just that. A police strike greeted the ICAC's early efforts against police
corruption, and a significant number of the Commission's operatives were harrassed
with constant police intimidation and arrests. Also the Prosecutions Division of the
Legal Department had to be convinced that the ICAC could mount winable cases.
With the police now appreciative of the consequence that the ICAC's efforts against
law enforcement corruption have allowed them to regain a significant degree of
public legitimacy, and with the anti-corruption focus swinging away from the Royal
Hong Kong Police Force, relations between the two bodies are cordial both on an
institutional and individual level. This has been supported further by the return to the
police of control over almost all aspects of their own internal affairs. Also the police
have been reassured that through the careful operations of the ICAC there has been
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little incursion by them into traditional areas of police concern. Police involved in
criminal investigations benefitted from the transfer of intelligence and the offence
'spinoffs' which were generated as a result of ICAC enquiries. Through joint training,
secondments, joint operations, and the exchange of information and expertise, the
co-operation between the ICAC and the police in Hong Kong has been sealed.
The Legal Department established its own commercial crime unit which specialises
in handling the more major ICAC investigations.
In these respects the integration of the ICAC within the wider criminal justice
process has been relatively swift, and a mixture of that which came through
complementary compromise, a minimisation of misinformation and resultant
suspicion, as well as that which has been imposed on the not too willing.
ACCOUNTABILITY
By Hong Kong standards, community involvement in the supervision and monitoring
of the ICAC is not insignificant. The ICAC would have us believe that the
independent mechanisms for "watching the watchdog" are sufficient to ensure that "it
does not step out of line".6 The combination of the ICAC Complaints Committee, the
Advisory Committee on Corruption, the Corruption Prevention Advisory
Committee, the Citizen's Advisory Committee on Community Relations, and the
complaints function of the Office of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative
Council, is said to keep the ICAC beyond reproach. But as a continuous stream of
cases where the ICAC has overstepped its powers simply in the prosecutions arena
bears testimony, this may not be enough.
THE NEW SOUTH WALES EXPERIENCE
If we test the identical features against the recent NSW experience we come up with
a very different scenario. The advent of the ICAC in this State occured within a
highly politicised environment. A change of government was at hand and both
contesting political parties were raising the spectre of a corruption control agency for
their respective electoral motives. The potency of this as a political card was fortified
by recent general public moral panics over the corruption and incompetence of each
major arm of criminal justice within the State. The widespread community cinicism
about the morality of public officials had tainted these political parties as well. The
media relentlessly 'beat up' community fears over the extent and depth of corruption
at all levels of public administration. The shocking revelations of the Fitgerald Royal
Commission in Queensland created an associated atmosphere of expectation about
corruption and its control, throughout the neighbouring State of NSW. Again the
press fed off the public enquiry approach to exposing corruption, and orchestrated
6 op. CIL supra n.4
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calls for a similar effort in NSW. The simple commitment to the open public
investigation of corruption caused a significant degree of legitimation to rub off onto
it's proponents (and alternatively flee its detractors).
The mandate for the NSW ICAC is far more open ended, and at the same time
particularly constrained than that which is the concern of its Hong Kong counterpart.
No handle is given on the notion of corrupt practices. A false distinction between
public and private 'sector' corruption is applied in the enabling legislation so as to
limit the interests of the new body to the vagueries of the former. By implication the
legislators have set up and accepted the inference that the community cost of public
practice corruption is both more immediate and significant. It is within this arena
that the new government hoped that the ICAC would give affect to its unstated
political agenda. This then was interpreted for the ICAC from its inception by the
media. The community on the other hand was heavily reliant on such media
interpretation because, except at the level of suspicion, its members had little
personal, individual contact with, or appreciation of obvious instances of corruption.
Against all these developments there was an active and influential opposition,
representing a wide cross-section of community views and reservations.
The powers of the new body were significantly restrictive by comparison with Hong
Kong. The powers given to the NSW body are somewhat overbalanced in their heavy
reliance on public enquiries as an information gathering technique. Such public
hearings sometimes strive towards contradictory and opposing purposes. As a fact
finding facility one might question the nature, quality and utility of the 'facts' which
they disclose. What is the purpose of such information gathering? It could not be
alleged, as is the case with the operations side of the Hong Kong ICAC, that such
was entirely prosecution oriented. In fact the value of the information arising out of
such public inquisitions is of strictly limited application in any eventual criminal
court proceedings. If the hearings of the NSW ICAC are not simply directed towards
the generation of admissable evidence alone, then why is it deemed necessary for the
hearings to operate within a quasi court structure? While functioning under many of
the general rules of evidence which govern the elicitation of facts in criminal trials,
such hearings may not only give rise to inadmissable evidence but they may
unwittingly cut across the efforts of associated criminal investigations which have as
their sole purpose the prosecution of offenders. In this regard the public hearing
function may tend to alienate the ICAC from the more traditional modems of
criminal justice. Further, they may be criticised for diverting resources from less
expensive and more direct, covert techniques. Bearing in mind the experience of the
recent ICAC public hearings, there can be no doubt that these are being used as an
opportunity for trial by media and the punitive public ransom of reputation. Rather
than helping to feed an insatiable community appetite for disclosures on corruption,
the threat of public shaming might tend eventually to distance the ICAC from
sources of community based information which are so strenuously protected in the
privacy provisions of the Hong Kong complaints function. Additionally the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance contains detailed and stringent restrictions on
public disclosure during ICAC investigations. This should not imply that the Hong
Kong body eschews the application of shaming. To the contary, it extensively utilises
images of public disgrace (in de-identified forms) as part of its prevention and
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education functions. But these are kept strictly separate from ICAC investigatory
operations. The only period throughout the latter where shaming might be witnessed
is if the ICAC chooses some delay between the occurrence of arrest, and charge.
As for the structure of the NSW ICAC it would appear that lipservice is paid to
community education and corruption prevention, while to date the bulk of its public
profile has concentrated on the operations front. There exists none of the
infrastructure in the NSW body which ensures for Hong Kong some protective
balance between these sometimes competing commitments.
It is too early in the operation of the NSW ICAC to make useful comments on its
degree of integration within the State criminal justice machine, nor on its
accountability. One can merely observe that the State police were largely critical of
its creation, and that the ultimate oversight of its operations rests with parliament.
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM ISOLATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
The indications are that while the Hong Kong ICAC has always attempted to locate
the legitimacy for its existance in both a symbolic and practical sense, well within the
community, the ICAC in NSW operates inside the structural limitations of a quasi
court and extra-policing paradigm. To be fair this difference might say more about
the respective communities within which both organisations function, than it does
about their own organizational predispositions. Even so the result is that the NSW
body will have the appearance of being somewhat removed from the community.
And for corruption prevention mechanisms in particular, what might be the adverse
consequences of such isolation?
On the level of the obvious, isolation from within the community for any agency of
social control will present problems for the credibility and effectiveness of their
prevention and education initiatives. In addition there is the danger of a reluctance
on the part of community members to 'get involved' with the workings of an
organisation which they fear, may not fully understand, or may not trust. This is a
particular source of frustration for more traditional crime control agencies in
Australia as they face a community which is averse to communicating with authority
at large. How much more will it be confronted by a new body with an as yet
unspecified field of interest?
With a largely open-ended mandate, which relies on discretionary interpretation
from the Commission and its parliamentary overseers, definitions and targetting of
corruption should reflect, amongst other things, community expectations. How are
these to be distilled if the Commission is isolated within a community which itself
seems too heavily dependent on media interpretation for formulating its
preocccupations with corruption?
Further, on media reliance, the NSW ICAC can be largely thankful to a sympathetic
media, and the explosive publicity surrounding the hearings of the Fitzgerald
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enquiry, for its creation. However the debt will remain ongoing, and as the continued
legitimacy of the ICAC is dependent on good press, so too its operations and focii of
interest might be effected by media distortion.
The heavily political birth of the ICAC, and the distinctly political interests of its
earliest enquiries run the danger of injecting a partisan image, fairly or unfairly, into
its public presentation. This can only lead to a further division of its community
support, and an increase in its isolation.
Alienation from other agencies of criminal justice in this State is also a worrying
possibility. If the history of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and the
National Crime Authority are anything to go by, another organisation which is seen
as challenging police independence, and perhaps poaching their traditional functions
and powers, will not be supported by that agency at least. This lack of co-operation
will fundamentally effect the crime control potential of a new and relatively small
operation. Unless the ICAC can present itself and its investigations as being of
benefit to other criminal justice agencies, then its rehabilitation from the realm of
initial distrust is unlikely.
As was well demonstrated by the last days of the Costigan Royal Commission, any
crime control initiative which is forced to turn in on itself will be far more likely to
fall foul of the artificiality of its internal stereotypes and obsessions, than
organisations which daily face the changing realities of community expectations.
CONCLUSION
The victim of corruption is portrayed usually as the community at large. The
responsibility for its eradication is also said to rest finally with the community.
Therefore any institutional response to corruption within liberal democratic
traditions must enlist the validity of community symbolism. The ICAC in Hong Kong
has been sensitive to this since its inception, and now claims its ultimate success, not
in terms of uncovering the corrupt, but rather as the orchestrator of a re-orientation
in community consciousness.
Even from such a cursory comparative analysis as presented above, it is obvious that
the NSW experience fails to reflect this understanding. And despite the general
alienation of criminal justice agencies from the public in this State, the ICAC risks
exaggerating its exclusion through the nature of its organisation and operations. The
likely consequences of this are all too clear, as the failures of previous institutional
approaches to corruption control in NSW testify. Accepting that on such a
fundamental measure as community integration the two ICACs are worlds apart, it
might prove true that in many other important respects similarity may extend no
further than their title.
